spill over into（externality 在经济学中是什么意思）

本文目录

• externality 在经济学中是什么意思
• 急死了！！英文好的请进来帮帮忙啊
• 林的英文怎么写
• 溢流染色机的工作原理
• spill over spill on 区别

externality 在经济学中是什么意思

在微观经济里，指的是对企业产生影响的外部因素，比如税收，政府调控之类的。不知道楼主问的哪方面的。
其实这个就要和SPILLOVER COST 以及SPILLOVER PROFIT 结合在一起，SPILLOVER COST 指溢出成本，比如抽烟，一个抽烟，影响其他人，政府就要多花钱给其他人治病。政府不愿意看到这种情况，就对烟草收税，同样的，酒，之类的商品都会收税，因为该商品有SPILLOVER COST.
相反的，如果一种商品存在SPILLOVER PROFIT，溢出收益，比如教育，作为一种服务，实际上就是一种商品：可以使国民的素质提高。政府就会千方百计地降低成本，鼓励教育的发展。因为教育存在着SPILLOVER PROFIT。
而EXTERNALITY就是指政府干预对企业的外部影响，比如政府可能认为企业生产的商品存在SPILLOVER COST，因此收税，所以这就是负的外部影响。如果政府觉得你的商品有利于社会，有SPILLOVER PROFIT,政府可能会鼓励你生产，可能给你发补贴之类的

急死了！！英文好的请进来帮帮忙啊

用下面的做参考吧。
Export credit agencies, known in trade finance as ECAs, are private or quasi-governmental institutions that act as intermediaries between national governments and exporters to issue export financing. The financing can take the form of credits (financial support) or credit insurance and guarantees (pure cover) or both, depending on the mandate the ECA has been given by its government. ECAs can also offer credit or cover on their own account. This does not differ from normal banking activities. Some agencies are government-sponsored, others private, and others a bit of both.
ECAs currently finance or underwrite about $430 billion of business activity abroad - about $55 billion of which goes towards project finance in developing countries - and provide $14 billion of insurance for new foreign direct investment, dwarfing all other official sources combined (such as the World Bank and Regional Development Banks, bilateral and multilateral aid, etc.). As a result of the claims against developing countries that have resulted from ECA transactions, ECAs hold over 25% of these developing countries’ US$2.2 trillion debt. These data are unreliable in the absence of source, definition, or date.
Officially supported export credits
Credits may be short term (up to two years), medium term (two to five years) or long term (five to ten years). They are usually supplier’s credits, extended to the exporter, but they may be buyer’s credits, extended to the importer. The risk on these credits, as well as on guarantees and insurance, is borne by the sponsoring government. ECAs limit this risk by being "closed" on risky countries, meaning that they do not accept any risk on these countries. In addition, a committee of government and ECA officials will review large and otherwise riskier than normal transactions.
Tied aid credits
Officially supported export credit may be connected to official development assistance (ODA) in two ways. First, they may be mixed with ODA, while still financing the same project (mixed credit). As the export credit is tied to purchases in the issuing country, the whole package qualifies as a tied aid credit, even if the ODA part is untied aid. Second, tied aid credits are not very different from export credits, except in interest, grace period (the time when there is no repayment of the principal) and terms of repayment. Such credits are separated from export credit by an OECD requirement that they have a minimum degree of "softness". "Softness" is measured by a formula that compares the present value of the credit with the present value of the same amount at standardized "commercial" terms. This difference is expressed as a percentage of the credit and called "concessionality level". Thus a grant has a concessionality level of 100%, a commercial credit scores zero per cent. The higher the concessionality level, the more the tied aid credit looks like ODA, the lower, the more it looks like an export credit.
Partially untied credits consist of a tied and an untied part. The latter is usually intended to finance "local cost", investment cost to be made in the importing country. This part may also be in a local currency. Partially untied aid is treated us tied aid.
International regulation
Both officially supported export credits and tied aid credit and grants are extended on terms controlled by governments. Therefore, there is a constant temptation to use these financial instruments to subsidize commercial exports in order to win a temporary advantage on an export market or to counterbalance such an action from another government (matching). However, the end result of such action is negative for importing countries (usually developing countries), who are rendered unable to choose the best combination of quality and price but consider financing first. It is also negative for tax payers, who foot the bill. It may only to the benefit of exporters whose government have the deepest pockets and the greatest willingness to subsidize, even though the macro-economic outcome of the subsidy is doubtful. In the past, there have been big, government-sheltered companies that were kept alive to a very large extent by export credits and tied aid credits. To avoid these traps, it was considered useful to standardize export credit conditions and to monitor matching and tied aid credits.
This situation has led first to an informal agreement in 1976 among some OECD countries, known as "The Consensus". This was succeeded in 1978 by a gentlemen’s agreement facilitated by the OECD’s now defunct Trade Directorate, which established a Working Party on Officially Supported Export Credits. This gentleman’s agreement, officially known as the Arrangement on Guidelines for Officially Supported Export Credits, is known as "The Arrangement". Although negotiations are facilitated by the OECD, not all OECD member countries are participants ad membership is possble for non-OECD countries.
Since 1999, country risk categories have been harmonized by the Arrangement and minimum premium rates have been allocated to the various risk categories. This is intended to ensure that competition takes place via pricing and the quality of the goods exported, and not in terms of how much support a state provides for its exporters. The Arrangement does not extend to exports of agricultural commodities or military equipment. A recent decision at the World Trade Organization (WTO) indicates that the use of officially supported export credits in agriculture is bound by WTO members’ commitments with respect to subsidised agricultural exports (see the WTO Appellate Body decision on the Brazil-US cotton case as it relates to the General Sales Manager (GSM) 102 and 103 programs and other US agricultural export credits).
The Berne Union, or officially, the International Union of Credit & Investment Insurers, is an international organisation for the export credit and investment insurance industry. The Berne Union and Prague Club combined have more than 70 member companies spanning the globe.
At EU level, the European Commission, in particular DG Trade, plays a role in the harmonization of Export Credit Agencies and the co-ordination of policy statements and negotiation positions. This is based on council decisions 73/391/EEC and 76/641/EEC. These decisions provide for prior consultations among member states on long term export credits. Member states may ask each other if they are considering to finance a specific transaction with official export credit support. EU members may not subsidize intra-EU export credits.
Polemic on ECAs
Observers argue for and against export credits. Some observers view them as nothing more than export subsidies by a different name. Others argue that export credits may further the burden of debt that poor countries already suffer. The activities of ECAs are considered by some to be a type of welfare for large corporations. ECAs are also criticised for insuring companies against political actions which aim to protect workers’ rights, other human rights or the natural environment in the countries where the investment is being made. Advocates of ECAs have assertions of their own, such as the following: export credits allow impoverished importers to purchase needed goods that would otherwise be unaffordable; export credits are components of a broader strategy of trade policies; and government involvement can achieve results that the private sector cannot, such as applying greater pressure on a recalcitrant borrower. These arguments for and against export credits are not new, having been studied at length in academic literature (for a good general discussion, see Baron, David P. The Export-Import Bank: An Economic Analysis. Academic Press. 1983.; or Eaton, Jonathan. “Credit Policy and International Competition.” Strategic Trade Policy and the New International Economics, ed. Paul Krugman. MIT Press, Cambridge Mass. 1988.). Of course, these arguments also spill over into broader literature and it is certainly important not to confuse the agency that applies the export credits, the ECA, with the actual policy of providing guarantees or direct lending support to facilitate exports. For example, some accuse the Canadian Wheat Board of providing export credits (for a strident representation of this argument, see Goodloe, Carol. “The Canadian Wheat Board: Government Guarantees and Hidden Subsidies?” The Estey Centre Journal of International Law and Trade Policy, Vol 5 No 2, p 102-122. 2004.).
ECAs are increasingly requiring member countries to undertake anti-corruption due diligence when applying for export credit. This is due to the increased international enforcement of anti-bribery laws.
ECAs play a pivotal role of getting new projects financed so the economy can be turned around from this recession. Most commercial banks are closed for new business and project funding is a scarce resource. The favourable Commercial Interest Reference Rate (CIRR is the reference rate laid down by the OECD for its member states as the minimum interest rate for officially supported financing of exports) is helping to keep your cost of capital down. But even more important is it that ECAs enables start ups to get financing, which again implies that projects are being realized.
The Export-Import Bank of the United States (Ex-Im Bank) is the official export credit agency of the United States federal government. It is an independent agency in the Executive branch established by Congress in 1934 for the purposes of financing and insuring foreign purchases of United States goods for customers unable or unwilling to accept credit risk. The mission of the Bank is to create and sustain U.S. jobs by financing sales of U.S. exports to international buyers. The Bank is chartered as a government corporation by the Congress of the United States; it was last Chartered, for a five year term, in 2006 (Senate Bill 3938, which became Public Law 109-438 on 12/20/2006). Its Charter spells out the Bank’s authorities and limitations. Among them is the principle that Ex-Im Bank does not compete with private sector lenders, but rather provides financing for transactions that would otherwise not take place because commercial lenders are either unable or unwilling to accept the political or commercial risks inherent in the deal. Its current chairman is James H. Lambright.

林的英文怎么写

问题一：林的英文怎么写 你好！
林
Lin

问题二：以林开头的英文名有哪些 Linda,Lina,Aylin,Linnie....
Lindy,Linus,Linclon...上边是女名，下边是男名，想了很久，望采纳

问题三：林的英语是什么（姓氏的） Lin~

问题四：林用英语怎么说？ forest,

问题五：林致逸用英语怎么说、 您好，中文名字在英语中属于专有名词，直接读拼音就可以了：
Lin Zhiyi或者Zhiyi Lin

问题六：森林的英文怎样拼写？ 可根据森林的大小， 分别翻译为：
forest (大的)森林
in the trees/in the woods (在中小型的)(森)林子里。
希望对你有帮助。

问题七：森林用英语怎么说？ forest

问题八：中国园林的英文怎么写啊 ch胆nese gardens
classical Chinese garden 中国古典园林
garden in the Chinese style中式园林

问题九：林的英文怎么写 你好！
林
Lin

问题十：姓氏林的英文怎么写 spill over onto their bank. They had lingered a good hour after they

溢流染色机的工作原理

溢流染色机是一种长度大概十几米的染缸，内设有转轮，带动布匹进行转动，在染色机的下部是一个又粗又长的染缸，染液都存在于染缸里，布匹的染色过程主要在于在下部染缸中的染色，通过控制布匹的运转速度来控制布匹在染缸中的浸润的时间，也控制了其染色的效果，这种染色机是每四个为一组，每一组的染缸是想通的，成连通器原理，而配料杠则位于一边，这就导致了溢流染色机染色的弊病，就是染色的结果可能是每一杠所出的布匹的染色效果不同，以离配料加料缸的远近而四缸呈现一种颜色由浅至深的效果，对于预配颜色较深的布匹来说，所产生的影响不会很大，而不适合于对预配颜色较浅的布的染色，易出现染色程度不同的影响。

spill over spill on 区别

spill over
1. 溢出：
Don’t pour too much;it might spill over.
别倒太满，会泼洒出来的
2. 超过…所能容纳的量；向…的外面扩展：
3. 发展成，形成；产生：
spill on
溅到
What’d you spill on it?
Nothing.
什么东西洒上面了？
没啊。